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Abstract: 
In the 2000s, the largest ports in the Hamburg - Le-Havre range encountered public 
resistance from nature preservation and environmental pressure groups during port 
expansion, resulting in conflicts and, moreover, delays. Eventually, in the case of 
Rotterdam the conflicts were settled, resulting in the broad acceptation of the port 
expansion and even support of the pressure groups. The main question is why. Using 
the discourse coalition approach it is shown, that there were three preconditions for 
the rise of support. Firstly, only through covenants and specific (compensation) 
projects local stakeholders could be persuaded to support port development. 
Secondly, politicians and civil servants had to accept the fact that the role of the 
pressure groups had changed. For example, most of the delays were caused by the 
resistance of politicians against the new role of the pressure groups. Thirdly, in 
general this case shows that only through conflicts with stakeholder such as pressure 
groups and local citizens, innovative new strategies can be applied. Only then 
politicians and civil servants are willing to change their stance towards them. In 




In the 2000s, the largest ports in the Hamburg - Le-Havre range proposed port 
expansions to profit from the growing flow of containers from Asia. Antwerp 
constructed the Deurganckdok, Hamburg Altenwerter and Rotterdam Maasvlakte II. 
In contrast to earlier expansions, all ports faced fierce resistance from public pressure 
groups. As a result of this resistance the construction in Antwerp took ten years, 
which was five years longer than expected by the government. Moreover, still no 
structural solution was found for the hindrance of port development. In Rotterdam the 
decision-making process on national level took eleven years, as a result of more than 
four years of delay. During this period conflicts were fierce; not only, as Maasvlakte 
II had considerable impact on nature, but also because pressure groups demanded 
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more influence than during earlier decision-making processes. Eventually in the case 
of Rotterdam the pressure groups did not only accept the port expansion, but also 
began to support it. Thus, a basis was formed for further cooperation. However, how 
did this consensus come about? As a result the main question of this paper is: Why 
was there so much conflict during and why was there so much support at the end of 
the decision-making process of Maasvlakte II (1993-2008)? 
 Maasvlakte II is a 2000 hectares (3000 footbal fields) port expansion on the 
Dutch coast (Figure 1). In 1991, as Rotterdam lacked space for port expansion on 
land, the Municipal Port Management of Rotterdam (hereinafter: the Port 
Management) proposed to the municipality of Rotterdam a land reclamation project of 
more than two billion euro (2004: 2,3 billion euro). Until 2004, the Port Management 
was a department of the municipality of Rotterdam, which implicated that major 
decisions were made in de city council of Rotterdam. Therefore, in this paper the term 
municipality of Rotterdam also applies to the Port Management.  
 
Figure 1: Maasvlakte II (in yellow) 
 
Source: Port of Rotterdam (2013) 
 
During the decision-making process different nature preservation and environmental 









Maasvlakte II. Based on Charles Tilly’s much cited definition of social movements, 
Wim van Noord created a definition of the environmental pressure groups: ‘a 
composition of actors and activities aimed against harm to nature and the landscape, 
the depletion of energy sources and raw materials and air, water and ground 
pollution.‘1 In this case the focus is specifically on organisations which tried to safe 
nature and the landscape from harm (nature preservation organisations) and those 
which fight air, water and ground pollution (environmental organisations). The nature 
preservation organisations were stakeholders as they managed the nature reserves 
around the port mouth and the city of Rotterdam. Moreover, the environmental 
pressure groups were involved as they were concerned about the direct and indirect 
effect of economic activities on Maasvlakte II on the liveability, including an increase 
of traffic.  
 In order to answer the main question, in part 2 a historical overview is given 
of the resistance against Rotterdam port development. Subsequently in part 3 and 4 
the most important conflicts between the governments and the pressure groups are put 
forward, showing their character and how they were settled. However, firstly the 
discourse coalitions approach is elucidated, as it is used in this paper to explain the 
changing stance of the pressure groups during the decision-making process of 
Maasvlakte II.  
 
Part 1: the approach 
In order to clarify why the stance of the pressure groups changed from resistance to 
acceptance, and later on to the support of Maasvlakte II, the discourse coalitions 
approach is used. This term was introduced in the influential book of Maarten Hajer 
the politics of environmental discourse, as an addition to earlier approaches towards 
policy-making, such as the more traditional advocacy coalitions approach.2 The most 
important addition of Hajer is that his approach does not only focus on groups of 
organisations with shared ‘normative and causal believes’ (advocacy coalitions), but 
                                                        
1 Charles Tilly and Lesley Wood, Social Movements, 1768-2012 (Boulder 2013, 3rd edition) 4-5.W. 
v. Noort, Bevlogen bewegingen; een vergelijking van de anti-kernenergie-, kraak-en milieubeweging 
(Nijmege 1988) 19. (original quote: ‘een samenstel van vele actoren en een verscheidenheid aan 
publiek activiteiten dat gericht is tegen de aantasting van natuur en landschap de uitputting van 
energiebronnen en grondstoffen en de verontreiniging van lucht, water en bodem’)  
2 Maarten A. Hajer, The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization and the 
policy process (Oxford 1997). 
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on groups of organisations with shared terms and concepts (discourse coalitions).3  In 
short, to illustrate this with the case of Maasvlakte II, his approach does not only 
focus on the supporter and opponents of Maasvlakte II, but on groups that share a 
common understanding of port development. In order to come to structural 
cooperation, pressure groups have to be part of the same discourse coalition as the 
governments.  
      Using among others Hajers discourse coalition approach, Anton van der 
Heijden explored the world-wide transition of environmental pressure groups from 
resistance towards more cooperation with the government. Van der Heijden agreed 
with Hajers suggestion that a new discourse coalition arose during the 1980s and 
1990s. The story of this coalition was that economic growth and the improvement of 
liveability were equally important. In practice, the government began to create 
integral development plans for regions, which linked economic stimulating projects to 
the creation of new nature reserves. In contrast to earlier discourse coalitions, not only 
the government and the private sector approved with this new storyline, but also 
pressure groups. In other words, whereas before pressure groups disapproved of the 
dominant story - stimulate the economy - and used their influence to delay or 
minimize the harm to nature and the environmental of the project; now they agreed 
with the policy, giving them the opportunity to constructively participate in decision-
making process. As a result, conflicts were no longer about the story, but about the 
procedure. This is an important explanatory factor in this paper. 
 
Part 2: The rise of resistance (1960-mid-1970s) 
In order to put the conflicts during the decision-making process of Maasvlakte II 
(1993-2008) in perspective, first a historical overview is given of the first resistance 
against Rotterdam port development. After the Second World War the port of 
Rotterdam was seen as the generator of new jobs and, subsequently, prosperity. 
Within twenty years, under leadership of among others the mayor of Rotterdam and 
the port director, the port grew fast, resulting in the establishment of a large industrial 
cluster of oil-companies. Among the public as well as the politicians there was 
support for the desire of the mayor and port director to expand the port. Mainly, 
because the Dutch citizens had recently witnesses the high unemployment of the 
                                                        
3 Ibidem, 68 
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1930s and underwent the destructions of the Second World War. As a result they 
united behind the policy of the government – the rebuilding-mentality.4 According to 
A. Lijphart this resulted in passive masses, who accepted the cooperation between the 
public and private sector and the decisions that were made. 5 In 1982, former-director 
of the Port Management, Frans Posthuma answered, in an interview in a Dutch 
newspaper, to the question if there was never any critique on the 1950s port 
expansions: ‘You know, we lived in a time of rebuilding and the horrors of the 
unemployment in the 1930s were still very much alive.’6 All in all, the politicians and 
the public accepted that the port had to expand in order to create more employment.  
 In the 1970s, the attitude towards the port changed radically from positive to 
negative. October 1970 and September 1971, the municipality of Vlaardingen, located 
next to the port, was confronted with thick smog.7 Although already in the 1960s 
smog was measured, never before was it so intense. For instance, in 1970 because of 
the pollution some schools even had to send their students home. Both periods of 
smog only lasted for two days; however, as can be seen in Figure 2 this resulted in an 
enormous increase in complaints in the region around the port. Simultaneously, the 
smog made the inhabitants also more aware of noise and water pollution. The 
resistance of the local population fuelled the efforts of pressure group. Moreover, it 
received more political attention.8  
 
Figure 2: Complaints of citizens in the Rhine Estuary Region about 
environmental pollution between 1968 and 1974 
Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Complaints 2432 7706 17653 27726 15163 19432 13218 
                                                        
4 C. J. Boender, Milieuprotest in Rijnmond: sociologische analyse van milieusolidariteit onder elites 
en publiek (Rotterdam 1985) 66. 
5 A. Lijphart, Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in de Nederlandse politiek (Amsterdam 1988) 11. 
6 Het Vrije Volk 1982, June 11th. C. J. Boender, Milieuprotest in Rijnmond: sociologische analyse van 
milieusolidariteit onder elites en publiek, 66. Original qoute: “Ach, we leefden in een tijd van 
wederopbouw. Het schikbeeld van de werkloosheid uit de jaren dertig zat er nog diep in bij de 
mensen.” 
7 K. Biersteker, 'Air pollution incident in Rotterdam, 1971', Environmental research, 10 (1975) 
349 and 350.; J. U. Brolsma, Havens, kranen, dokken en veren (Rotterdam 2006) 268. 
8 See for an extensive description: F. De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie. Rotterdam en de vestiging van 
industrie in de haven 1945-1975. 
(Delft 1990) 245. 
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Index (1968=100) 100 317 726 1140 623 799 544 
Source: Kees Boenders, Milieuprotest in Rijnmond (1985), 139. 
 
Policy was, not only, developed to decrease the environmental pollution, but also to 
reduce the damage to nature. Early 1960s, initiated by local pressure groups on 
provincial level, the construction of a demarcation line was discussed, an imaginary 
line drawn on a map in order to prevent a port expansion towards the south, where the 
dunes of Voorne, a unique nature reserve, was located (Figure 3). The concern about 
the future of the dunes was caused by the previous partial destruction of nature 
reserve De Beer, during the construction of the port expansion Europoort and would 
completely disappear with the construction of Maasvlakte I. The line was drawn in 
reaction to the local fear for new aggressive port expansions. The demarcation line 
separated on the one side an area for the establishment of industry and other port 
activities (north) and on the other side an area for recreation and nature (south). July 
21th 1964, the national government officially agreed with the identified demarcation 
line.9 Consequently, Maasvlakte II would have to be constructed directly into the 
North Sea, making this expansion two times more expensive than the creation of 
Maasvlakte I. In other words, already mid-1960s the pressure groups were able to 
directly influence the policy towards the port. 
 
Figure 3: The 1964 demarcationline (line in red) 
                                                        
9 A. Steekelenburg, 'Het geheugen van de milieubeweging', Milieu-Actief, 27 (2002) 18-19.; J: F. De 
Goey, Ruimte voor industrie. Rotterdam en de vestiging van industrie in de haven 1945-1975. 
(Delft 1990) 212. 
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Source: Port of Rotterdam (2013). 
The protest against pollution and harm to nature resulted, finally, in the end of port 
expansion. Although in the 1970s, the port director and mayor Rotterdam tried a last 
time to find support for port expansion, port development came to a halt. Moreover, 
until the mid-1990s due to the oil crises (1973 and 1979) the plots of the last 
expansion would stay largely empty. Until the mid-1990s, therefore, the need for 
further expansions became unnecessary, making direct confrontations between the 
port and the pressure groups rare.  
 All in all, the port expansion was based on the story of creating employment 
and becoming more independent of Germany. This story was uttered by a few 
influential men in Rotterdam and was supported by the public. However, within a 
short timeframe the port expansion came to a halt, as a new dominant discourse 
coalition arose. The pressure groups questioned the need for port expansion, as a 
result of the increasing pollution and demanded new legislation. This new legislation 
was created fast as the pressure groups were strongly publicly supported. As both the 
pressure groups and the supporter of port expansion had fundamentally different 
stories – economic growth for employment versus limits to growth and improvement 
of the liveability – conflicts led to division. As is shown in the next part, this differed 
considerably from the conflict during the 1990s, during which both parties supported 
the same story, but were only in conflict about the procedure. As a result, conflict did 




Part 3: from confrontation to acceptation (1990s-2005) 
Between the last port expansion in 1969-1973 (Maasvlakte I) and the start of the 
decision-making process of the new port expansion in 1993 (Maasvlakte II), the 
relation between the government and pressure groups changed considerably. During 
the 1970s the government and the pressure groups had a hostile relation, as the policy 
of the government was opposed through protest and activism.10 A decade later the 
government began to acknowledge the expertise of the pressure groups and small 
steps were taken towards cooperation. Firstly, during the early-1980s, pressure groups 
were pushed to alter their approach towards the government as a result of socio-
economic changes. Employment increased fast and the awareness arose that the 
Netherlands was lagging behind in technical innovation.11 Secondly, pressure groups 
were also prepared to change their approach as it became clear that protest did not 
result in the desired improvements to projects or governmental policy. Consequently, 
the groups were more prepared to cooperate.12 Thirdly, late 1980s increasingly more 
former members of the pressure groups began to work for the ministry of Spatial 
Planning and the Environment – ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Ruimtelijke 
Ordening en Milieu (VROM), resulting in a more cooperative attitude of the ministry 
towards the pressure groups.13 The improved ties between this ministry and the 
pressure groups did not result in a direct increase of support for cooperation in the 
other ministries. However, during the 1990s, this slowly changed. Fourthly, between 
the 1980s and the 1990s the membership of the pressure groups grew rapidly. The 
total membership of the four largest national pressure groups increased from 412,000 
members in 1980 to 2,036,000 in 1995.14 In other words, the number of members 
increased by five. This required more professional organisations, as the members had 
to be informed and the financial means were available.15 Moreover, as the 
organisations became financially more dependent on their members, these 
organisations became less radical and more practical.  
                                                        
10 J. Cramer, De groene golf: geschiedenis en toekomst van de Nederlandse milieubeweging» toon 
extra info. (Utrecht 1989) 122. 
11 Ibidem, 89 
12 Ibidem, 99-100 
13 Ibidem, 122 
14 Hein-Anton v. d. Heijden, Tussen aanpassing en verzet. Milieubeweging en milieudiscours 
(Amsterdam 2000) 117. 
15 Ibidem, 66-67 
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In 1991, within this context, the Port Management created its influential and 
visionary Port Plan 2010, quantitatively based on the 1990 Goods Flow Model 6.16 
Two different kinds of projects were identified to increase the competitiveness of the 
port. Firstly, more than nine projects for the improvement of the accessibility of the 
port were put forward. Secondly, six projects for the future development of the port 
were outlined, of which Maasvlakte II was the most daring and costly. In 1993, an 
inquiry into Maasvlakte II was accepted by the municipality of Rotterdam and the 
national government by adding it to the regional program of the national government. 
In this regional program, investments for economic development were linked to the 
improvement of the liveability. Maasvlakte II was for example linked to the creation 
of 750 hectare of new nature reserve. 
No pressure groups were involved in the creation of neither the Port Plan 2010 
nor the regional program; however, letters were written in reaction to both the plan 
and the program, showing the support of the pressure groups of the integral planning 
and the willingness of the pressure groups to cooperate. For example, an alternative to 
the Port Plan 2010 was published by the umbrella group Foundation Nature and the 
Environment - Stichting Natuur en Milieu - and its regional counterpart 
Environmental Defence Zuid-Holland - Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie.17 The 
umbrella group was a lobby organisation having strong and useful contacts with the 
national government. The influence of this lobby organisation was considerable as it 
represented 1.3 million people (2000).18 The alternative plan for the Port Plan 2010 
consisted of 25 ideas to strengthen the regional economy.19 Not only, critique was 
presented of Maasvlakte II in relation to the damage to nature, but also specific 
questions were raised about its benefits to the Dutch economy. In other words, the 
pressure groups showed broad expertise. Their ideas, however, were only partly 
incorporated in both the Port Plan 2010 and the regional program and the 
representatives of the pressure groups were left out of the formal meetings. This had 
different reason: firstly, it was already a major achievement to design a intra-
                                                        
16 Goederenstromenmodel 6, Unknown, ‘Goederenstroommodel 6 volop in de publiciteit’, Van Poort 
tot Europoort 6/31 (1990) the 400 million tonnes of transshipment in 2010, was one of 4 scenarios for 
the future. The less positive scenarios estimated subsequently 353, 299 and 270 million tonnes in 2010.        
17 E. Dil, R. Adams, A. Doe, R. Kouprie and D. Weijsters, Plan van aanpak en beleidsconvenant: 
ROM-project Rijnmond, Stuurgroep ROM-Rijnmond, Rotterdam, (1993) 11. (Zuid-Hollandse 
Milieufederatie and Stichting Natuur en Milieu) 
18 Hein-Anton v. d. Heijden, Tussen aanpassing en verzet. Milieubeweging en milieudiscours, 79 
19 E. Dil, Plan van aanpak en beleidsconvenant: ROM-project Rijnmond, 11 
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governmental program.20 In others words, at that time, including the pressure groups 
was one step to far. Secondly, fear still existed that the pressure groups would use the 
inside information during the meetings, against the government through, for example, 
juridical means.    
 Mid-1990s, the stance towards the pressure groups changed due to fierce 
resistance against one of the megaproject: the Betuweroute. This dedicated rail freight 
train corridor towards the German border was implemented top-down, resulting in 
long delays due to public opposition.21 In 1994, in reaction to this problem the 
Advising Council to the Cabinet - Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid 
(WRR) - began an inquiry into the decision-making process of megaprojects.22 Its 
conclusions would result in the change of the decision-making processes of Dutch 
megaprojects, adding a national discussion during the first phase. The idea was that 
when the public input in the decision-making process of Maasvlakte II would 
increase, the delays in later phases of the project would decrease.  
Also the pressure groups learned from decision-making processes such as the 
Betuweroute. It had shown them that by using juridical procedures at the end of the 
official decision-making process, a project could only be delayed or partly changed. 
The new idea was to participate from the very start, whereby projects concerning 
sustainability and environmental protection could be incorporated in the project.23 In 
1995, Arno Steekelenburg, employee of the provincial environmental pressure group 
based in Rotterdam, Environmental Defence Zuid-Holland, established ‘ConSept’. 
This was a cooperation of seven nature and environmental pressure groups in the 
province of Zuid-Holland. Its goal was showing the willingness to improve the 
relation with the governments and the private sector regarding the decision-making 
process of Maasvlakte II.24 More specifically, share their expertise and on the other 
hand influence the decision-making process. For instance, the nature preservation 
pressure groups were concerned about the harm to nature and concurrently and, 
simultaneously, they wanted to have a say in the location of the 750 hectare of new 
nature reserve that was linked to Maasvlakte II. 
                                                        
20 Interview Gerbrand Naeff, employee ministry of Transport and Spatial Planning (March 19th 2012). 
21 P. Pestman, In het spoor van de Betuweroute. Mobilisatie, besluitvorming en institutionalisering 
rond een groot infrastructureel project. (Amsterdam 2001) 9-10. 
22 Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Besluiten over grote projecten, (1994) . 
23 Interview: Ellen Verkoelen, director of Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland (March 18th, 2013). 
24 ‘Con’(Spanish for ‘with’) and ‘Sept’ (French for ‘seven’).  
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Despite the cooperative attitude of the pressure groups, five months after the 
start of the national discussion all pressure groups refused further participation. The 
reason was the attitude of the municipality of Rotterdam and the cabinet towards 
Maasvlakte II. The Port Management simply refused to participate, which was in 
concordance with the opinion of the city council to focus on the lobby for Maasvlakte 
II.25 The Port Management was already discussing the best variant of Maasvlakte II, 
whereas in the national discussion the necessity of a port expansion was still 
discussed.26 Although eventually Rotterdam was persuaded to join the national 
discussion, their three years research into the Maasvlakte II project before the national 
discussion could not be undone. As a result, the pressure groups felt as if the 
discussion was already based on the premise that Maasvlakte II would be build.27  
Moreover, the ministries did not show direct interest in the national discussion, as it 
was seen as a public rather than a governmental discussion. However, as parliament 
wanted to come to terms with the pressure groups, they proposed to discuss the 
usefulness and necessity of Maasvlakte II again, but this time on a national level.  
July 1997, directly after the national discussion the Project Mainport 
Rotterdam (PMR) organisation was established by the ministry of Transport to make 
an agreement on national level possible. Out of a long-list, eight organisations were 
selected. Criteria to cooperate were: administrative influence, extensive expertise and 
interest in a dialog with other stakeholders with different interests. Of these eight 
groups three were nature and environmental pressure groups. The first on was a major 
manager of nature in the region of the port – Vereninging Natuurmonumenten. This 
organisation was, in terms of members, the largest organisation in the Netherlands 
and had thus administrative influence and expertise. The second organisation was the 
umbrella organisation Foundation Nature and the Environment. The third organisation 
was ConSept, in which seven local and national cooperated. In other words, the 1997 
conflict resulted in more influence of the pressure groups on the decision-making 
process, as they were incorporated in the formal meetings. For over a half a year a 
basis was laid for cooperation, however, this input from the pressure groups was 
depended on the willingness of the minister of Transport to listen.  
                                                        
25 Archive: Gemeente Archief Rotterdam, GA 589.01a 7854. 
26 Municipal Archive Rotterdam, GA 589.01a 7854. Four phases: (1) project planning, (2) choosing a 
variant, (3) permits and (4) construction. 
27 Unknown, De Volkskrant, October 2th 1996 (Milieuorganisaties stappen boos uit overleg Tweede 
Maasvlakte) and J. Van der Schot, 'Tweede Maasvlakte. Zorgvuldiger besluit of massagetechniek?', 
Natuur en Milieu, 20 (1996) 13. 
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October 1998, the new minister of Transport showed her disapproval of the 
cooperation with the different pressure groups. According to her, first the cabinet was 
to define its wishes and then negotiate.28 Consequently, almost no input of the 
pressure groups was accepted. This resulted in nine months of discussion in the media 
about the role of pressure groups in the decision-making process.29 As the chairman 
of one of the pressure groups said: ‘the civil servants understood the need for 
cooperation, but the minister [was] unaware of this new development.’30 
On a local level this discussion was closely watched, as the municipality, 
owning the port, desired a fast decision-making. During 1999, the municipality of 
Rotterdam changed its stance towards the pressure groups in order to settle the 
conflict on national level.31 May 2000, after almost a year of secret meetings between 
the different parties, an agreement was reached, called: Vision and Courage (Visie en 
Durf). This was a visionary agreement, as decisions were made about the qualitative 
improvement of the region on the long term, and courageous as both parties were 
prepared to cooperate. The covenant was signed by the municipality of Rotterdam, 
ConSept and the two major managers of the nature areas in the port region. In the 
document, not only, an agreement was reached about the size of Maasvlakte II, the 
location of the new 750 hectares of nature reserve, but also compensation measures. 
After the covenant was signed the spokesman of ConSept said: ‘it took long, a three 
to four years fight, to come to a serious dialog’.32 ‘However, with this plan we give a 
signal to the national government (..) moreover, we trust the municipality of 
Rotterdam.’33 The Port Management reacted that ‘this was a successful effort to put 
our point of view next to each other’.34 From their reaction it can be concluded that 
this approach was radically new for both parties. Simultaneously both parties were 
delighted by the eventual outcome. The agreement Vision and Courage was used on a 
national level to come to a final agreement about Maasvlakte II.  
                                                        
28 PMR, Logboek (February 2002, Den Haag), 32. 
29 Unknown, ‘Milieubeweging stopt overleg Maasvlakte 2’, Financieel Dagblad (November 12th, 
1998). 
30 Interview: Ellen Verkoelen, director of Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland (March 18th, 2013).  
31 Gemeente Rotterdam, Havenbedrijf Rotterdam, natuurorganisaties, Visie en durf, (2000) 2. 
32T. Van der Veeken, 'Havenbedrijf en milieubeweging. In het Rotterdamse ...', Milieu-Actief, 27 
(2002) 11. Original quote: ‘De slag om serieus in gesprek met elkaar te komen, duurde lang, 3-4 jaar.’ 
33 Unknown, ‘Akkoord tweede maasvlakte’, Trouw June 6th 2000. Original quote: ‘(…) maar met dit 
plan willen we een signal afgeven aan politiek Den Haag (…). Bovendien hebben we vertrouwen in de 
gemeente Rotterdam.’ 
34Ibidem, 10. Original quote: Willem Scholten: ‘Visie en Durf is een geslaagde poging geweest om 
standpunten hard en onomwonden neer te leggen’. 
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Early 2000, based on the Vision and Courage agreement, also on national 
level the parties came to an agreement. The content of the agreement was even more 
important, as the influence of the pressure groups had increased. In reaction to the 
conflict with the minister a new procedural structure was created by a negotiator. In 
contrast to the earlier procedure, the minister had no other choice than to react on the 
advice of the pressure groups. Under pressure of the pressure groups and parliament, 
she accepted this new procedure. May 2001, with the input of Vision and Courage an 
agreement was reached between all pressure groups.35 April 2002, the project was 
finally accepted in parliament. Moreover, between 2002 and 2005 the national law on 
spatial planning, needed to create Maasvlakte II, was approved of in parliament and 
the senate.           
The discourse coalition approach shows, firstly, that in contrast to the 1970s 
conflict, the frictions were now caused by the procedure rather than the content. Both 
the pressure groups and government underlined the need for integral planning, but 
disagreed on the influence of the pressure groups. As a result, after the municipality 
as well as the cabinet accepted more influence fast steps were made towards 
agreements about the content. Secondly, as the conflict was about the procedure 
rather than the content, these conflicts were a precondition to cooperation and the 
acceptance of Maasvlakte II. For example, only because of the delays caused by the 
conflict between the ministers, the municipality was urged to approach the pressure 
groups differently to find a solution.       
 
Part 4: From acceptation to support (2005-2008) 
After the acceptance of the law on spatial planning, the opportunity was given to the 
public to make appeals. January 2005, against all expectations several of the 13 
appeals were declared founded. According to the Council of State, among others more 
research into the expected damage to nature along the Dutch Coast was needed.  
Moreover, in the statement of the Council of State it was underlined that questions 
could be posed about the possible pollution generated by the activities on Maasvlakte 
II. A few remarks can be made about this judgement of the Council of State. Two 
pressure groups which appealed were not involved in the meetings with the 
government. In other words, as the groups were excluded they began a juridical 
                                                        
35 M. Wesselink and R. Paul, Handboek strategisch omgevingsmanagement (Deventer 2010) 50-51. 
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procedure. Furthermore, although one of the appealing parties was too late 
questioning the validity of the research into the environmental pollution, it activated 
the radical Environmental Defence – Milieudefensie - to start resisting the project 
Maasvlakte II. In other words, appeals can trigger new appeals. Moreover, four 
objecting parties were citizens and one a cooperation of citizens. Particularly, also the 
opinions of individual citizens became important. Between 2005 and 2008 efforts 
were intensified on local and national level to persuade all parties to not only accept, 
but also support Maasvlakte II to avoid new appeals.     
 In 2006, two decisions were made. Firstly, on national level the law on spatial 
planning needed for Maasvlakte II was ‘repaired’ and not created from scratch after 
the appeals. Therefore, the law only had to be accepted by parliament and the senate 
and did not have to pass the judgement of the Council of State. Secondly, the binding 
character of the law for the development plans on local level was changed. As a 
result, on local level an agreement had to be reached about the specific location of 
Maasvlakte II and the compensation measures. The goal of changing the binding 
character was to make the law less complex and easier to implement on local level. 
Simultaneously, it requested, however, for intensive cooperation between all actors on 
local level, including the parties who made appeals against the nation law. Especially, 
as, in 2008, these parties could make appeals against the local development plans.   
The management of the port, which was corporatized in 2004 (hereinafter: the 
Port Authority), requested to become the coordinator of the project on local level, 
which was granted by the national government.36 To a certain degree this was a 
radical change, as normally the parties were in discussion with the ministers, and the 
burgomaster and alderman port of Rotterdam. The advantage, however, of having the 
Port Authority of Rotterdam as a direct partner was its ability to make deals and 
create covenants on behalf of the local and national government; especially as the 
national and local government owned, respectively, 30 and 70 percent of the shares of 
the Port Authority. 
Only because of the many failures in the past, to come to an understanding and 
avoid further delays, the Port Authority accepted a radical new strategy towards all 
stakeholders in the region.37 It was called Strategic Environment Management – 
                                                        
36 Interview Hans smits, former-director of the Port Authority of Rotterdam (November 15th 2012). 
37 Interview Marc Wesselink, consultant SOM (September 10th 2013). 
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Strategisch Omgevingsmanagement (SOM).38 The goal of SOM was to broaden the 
coalition by searching for all possible stakeholders in the Maasvlakte II project. As a 
result, more than 170 possible stakeholders were identified and approached, although 
some of them did not even consider themselves to be a stakeholder.39 Using this broad 
search it was possible to find structural solutions for problems in the region and make 
deals and covenants if needed. An example of a deal made was about the railway 
bridge near the municipality of Rozenburg, which is located within the port region.40 
This municipality was afraid of more intensive use of the railway bridge due to 
Maasvlakte II, resulting in noise pollution. If the municipality would withdraw its 
appeal, the Port Authority offered to help to find a solution to the problem in 
cooperation with the national government. In other words, to gain the support of the 
stakeholders specific solutions were found for specific problems.  
As on the one hand more pressure groups began to support Maasvlakte II and 
on the other hand in the media and parliament the negative effects of the resistance of 
pressure groups against large infrastructural projects was emphasised, also the last 
opponent, Environmental Defence - Milieudefensie - was persuaded to withdraw its 
appeal. As a result, 2008 the start of the construction of Maasvlakte II could begin. 
No structural agreement was, however, reached with this radical pressure group. In 
other words, some pressure groups still preferred juridical means to cooperation. 
A large group of pressure groups, however, chose for more structural 
cooperation. May 2008, based partly on the Vision and Courage agreement, the 
Vision and Trust agreement was signed (Visie en Vertrouwen). The goal of this 
agreement was to overcome the constant distrust between all parties, caused by 
political changes and new directors. Consequently, the Vision and Courage agreement 
had to be improved. Visions and Trust was a ‘non-personal’ agreement and it 
underlined, among others, the need to monitor the implementation of the agreement. 
The monitoring would continue for the coming decades. As a result, structural trust 
was created and the basis was set for further cooperation during port development.  
                                                        
38 M. Wesselink and R. Paul, Handboek strategisch omgevingsmanagement (Deventer 2010) 50-51. 
39 Johanna Muis, Stakeholdermanagemetn bij Maasvlakte 2, March 25th 2013. 
http://www.decommunicatiedesk.nl/artikel/-
/marketing_artikel/411462/Stakeholdermanagement+bij+Maasvlakte+2 (09-01-2014).  




Moreover, based on this agreement and the deals with the other stakeholder, 
35 projects were accepted in order to improve the liveability in the city of Rotterdam 
and around the port, including the creation of the 750 hectares of new nature reserve 
north and south of the city of Rotterdam. Therefore, the Maasvlakte II was more than 
a generator of employment and added value (hard value), but also the incentive for the 
creation of nature reserves and the improvement of the liveability (soft value). 
Already in 2007, a scholar saw the need of ports to focus on soft values 
management.41 For example, showing the growth of the transhipment or the size of 
the largest containerships entering the port did not longer generate enough support. 42 
Therefore, soft values, which can be defined as non-socio-economic aspect of a port, 
had to be shown in order to restore public support for the port and port development.43  
 All in all, as a result of the new approach most stakeholders described the 
decision-making process of Maasvlakte II as best practice.44 Furthermore, no 
organisation made an appeal. Moreover, structural cooperation was achieved with the 
signing of the Vision and Trust agreement in which the monitoring of the 35 projects 
were accepted. As a result, for the coming decades the most important pressure 
groups and the Port Authority would meet every half a year in order to deliberate 
about the development of the projects.  
Using the discourse coalition approach it can be shown, firstly, that only by 
creating smaller stories out of the big story (integral planning) it was possible to find 
structural support for Maasvlakte II. For example, the story about the improvement of 
the liveability and the creation of nature reserves (soft values). Secondly, however, 
this approach was only approved of by the Port Authority as a result of the failures to 
come to an understanding in the past. In other words, the conflicts during the 




Late 1990s and mid-2000s the Dutch governments were confronted with resistance 
form pressure groups against Maasvlakte II, which resulted in considerable delays. As 
a result, the main question was: why was there so much conflict during and why so 
                                                        
41 E. Van Hooydonk, Soft values of seaports (Antwerp 2007). 
42 Ibidem, 54-55 
43 The writers interpretation of Ibidem, 57 
44 M. Wesselink, Handboek strategisch omgevingsmanagement.  
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much support at the end of the decision-making process of Maasvlakte II (1993-
2008)? 
 Using the theory on discourse coalitions it becomes clear that in contrast to 
the 1970s the pressure groups and governments shared a common vision: the integral 
planning of regions. As a result, the pressure groups wanted to be involved in the 
decision-making process as representatives of liveability and nature. However, 
whereas during the early 1990s the pressure groups fast recognized the need for 
cooperation, the governments transformed more slowly. As a result, conflicts were 
needed to create break-throughs both on local as on national level. After the 2000 
break-through was a fact, agreements on the content were made fast, as both parties 
underlined the need for an integral development of the region. 
 The 2005 conflict showed, however, that even more parties had to be 
consulted before coming to a final solution. Again the conflict itself was the incentive 
for the Port Authority to use a radical new strategy to persuade the 170 stakeholders 
to withdraw their appeals. As the Port Authority was corporatized it was able to react 
faster to changes in society and make covenants. Moreover, as increasingly more 
stakeholders began to support Maasvlakte II, public and political pressure was put on 
the opponents of Maasvlakte II to withdraw their appeal.      
 All in all, a few conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the analysis showed that 
only through covenants and specific (compensation) projects local stakeholders can 
be persuaded to support port development. This is in concordance with recent 
literature on port development, which underlines the need to stress the soft values of 
the port.   
Secondly, in order to accomplish a port development projects the local 
mentality is of paramount importance. Whereas during the 1950s the local 
communities were passive, during the 2000s they were pro-active and even prepared 
to make appeals at the Council of State. Consequently, the coalition had to be 
broadened to include all stakeholders and the story has to be changed into smaller 
stories. In other words, it seems as if during the 2000s a new discourse coalition is 
rising. However, more research is needed to show whether such a broad coalition 
really exists or one should speak of a whole range of smaller discourse coalitions 
bound by one single project.  
Thirdly, in the introduction it was put forwards that all port in the Hamburg -
Le-Havre range were confronted with conflicts during the decision-making processes 
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of port expansion. This case shows that only through conflict, innovative new 
approaches can be applied.  Only then politicians became willing to accept changes to 
the decision-making process. In other words, the comforting thought is that actually 
the conflict is the key to a structural solution. 
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